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1 ♦ more
♦ more /mɔ:(r)/A a. e pron. indef.più; di più; altro; dell'altro; ancora; in aggiunta; ulteriore: I have more money than you, ho più denaro di te; many more, molti di più; Bring me some more water, portami dell'altra acqua (o ancora acqua)!; I want more books, voglio più libri (o ancora dei libri, altri libri); There is more food in the refrigerator, c'è dell'altro cibo nel frigorifero; That is more than enough, (ciò) è più che sufficiente; ce n'è d'avanzo; I don't want any more, non ne voglio più; I don't smoke any more, non fumo più; Stay a little more, rimani ancora un po'B avv. (compar. di much)più; di più; maggiormente: He is more intelligent than his brother, è più intelligente di suo fratello; We found it more easily than I thought, lo abbiamo trovato più facilmente di quanto credessi● more and more, sempre più: He's getting more and more forgetful, diventa sempre più distratto □ the more the merrier, più siamo, meglio è □ the more … the more, più… più: The more he has, the more he wants, più ha, più vorrebbe avere □ more often than not, abbastanza spesso; il più delle volte □ more or less, più o meno; press'a poco; quasi: I've more or less finished the final draft, ho più o meno finito l'ultima stesura □ and more than this, e quel che più conta □ and what is more, e quel che più conta; e per di più; inoltre □ more than meets the eye, dell'altro; qualcosa di più; qualcosa sotto (fig.): There's more in his proposal than meets the eye, c'è dell'altro nella sua proposta □ neither more nor less than, né più né meno che; semplicemente: That's neither more nor less than absurd!, è semplicemente assurdo (o ridicolo)! □ nothing more, nient'altro □ no more, non… più; mai più; neanche, neppure: I can do no more, non posso fare di più; I have no more, non ne ho più; I saw him no more, non lo vidi mai più □ once more, ancora una volta; di nuovo □ He is no more, non è più; è morto □ (offrendo qc.) Any more for any more?, c'è qualcuno che ne vuole ancora? NOTA D'USO: - sempre piu…-. -
2 more
❢ When used to modify an adjective or an adverb to form the comparative more is very often translated by plus: more expensive = plus cher/chère ; more beautiful = plus beau/belle ; more easily = plus facilement ; more regularly = plus régulièrement. For examples and further uses see A 1 below.When used as a quantifier to indicate a greater amount or quantity of something more is very often translated by plus de: more money/cars/people = plus d'argent/de voitures/de gens. For examples and further uses see B 1 below.A adv1 ( comparative) it's more serious than we thought/you think c'est plus grave que nous ne pensions/vous ne pensez ; the more intelligent (child) of the two (l'enfant) le plus intelligent des deux ; he's no more honest than his sister il n'est pas plus honnête que sa sœur ; the more developed countries les pays plus développés ;2 ( to a greater extent) plus, davantage ; you must work/sleep/rest more il faut que tu travailles/dormes/te reposes davantage ; he sleeps/talks more than I do il dort/parle plus que moi ; you can't paint any more than I can, you can no more paint than I can tu ne sais pas plus peindre que moi ; the more you think of it, the harder it will seem plus tu y penseras, plus ça te paraîtra dur ; he is (all) the more determined/angry because il est d'autant plus déterminé/en colère que ;3 ( longer) I don't work there any more je n'y travaille plus ; I couldn't continue any more je ne pouvais pas continuer plus longtemps ; she is no more littér elle n'est plus ;4 ( again) once/twice more une fois/deux fois de plus, encore une fois/deux fois ; he's back once more il est de nouveau de retour ;5 ( rather) more surprised than angry plus étonné que fâché ; he's more a mechanic than an engineer il est plus mécanicien qu'ingénieur ; it's more a question of organization than of money c'est plus une question d'organisation que d'argent.B quantif more cars than people plus de voitures que de gens ; more eggs than milk plus d'œufs que de lait ; more cars than expected/before plus de voitures que prévu/qu'avant ; some more books encore quelques livres ; a little/lot more wine un peu/beaucoup plus de vin ; more bread encore un peu de pain ; there's no more bread il n'y a plus de pain ; have some more beer! reprenez de la bière ; have you any more questions/problems? avez-vous d'autres questions/problèmes? ; we've no more time nous n'avons plus le temps ; nothing more rien de plus ; something more autre chose, quelque chose d'autre.C pron1 ( larger amount or number) plus ; it costs more than the other one il/elle coûte plus cher que l'autre ; he eats more than you il mange plus que toi ; the children take up more of my time les enfants prennent une plus grande partie de mon temps ; many were disappointed, more were angry beaucoup de gens ont été déçus, un plus grand nombre étaient fâchés ; we'd like to see more of you nous voudrions te voir plus souvent ;2 ( additional amount) davantage ; ( additional number) plus ; tell me more (about it) dis-m'en davantage ; I need more of them il m'en faut plus ; I need more of it il m'en faut davantage ; we found several/a few more (of them) in the house nous en avons trouvé plusieurs/quelques autres dans la maison ; I can't tell you any more je ne peux pas t'en dire plus ; have you heard any more from your sister? as-tu d'autres nouvelles de ta sœur? ; I have nothing more to say je n'ai rien à ajouter ; in Mexico, of which more later… au Mexique, dont nous reparlerons plus tard… ; let's ou we'll say no more about it n'en parlons plus.D more and more det phr, adv phr de plus en plus ; more and more work/time de plus en plus de travail/de temps ; to work/sleep more and more travailler/dormir de plus en plus ; more and more regularly de plus en plus régulièrement.F more so adv phr encore plus ; in York, and even more so in Oxford à York et encore plus à Oxford ; it is very interesting, made (even) more so because c'est très intéressant, d'autant plus que ; he is just as active as her, if not more so ou or even more so il est aussi actif qu'elle, si ce n'est plus ; (all) the more so because… d'autant plus que… ; they are all disappointed, none more so than Mr Lowe ils sont tous déçus, en particulier M. Lowe ; no more so than usual/the others pas plus que d'habitude/les autres.1 ( greater amount or number) plus de ; more than 20 people/£50 plus de 20 personnes/50 livres sterling ; more than half plus de la moitié ; more than enough plus qu'assez ;2 ( extremely) more than generous/happy plus que généreux/ravi ; the cheque more than covered the cost le chèque a amplement couvert les frais ; you more than fulfilled your obligations tu as fait plus que remplir tes obligations.she's nothing more (nor less) than a thief, she's a thief, neither more nor less c'est une voleuse, ni plus ni moins ; he's nothing ou no ou not much more than a servant ce n'est qu'un serviteur ; and what is more… et qui plus est… ; there's more where that came from ce n'est qu'un début. -
3 More
[mɔː(r)] 1.quantisostantivo femminile1)2) more and more sempre più2.more and more work, time — sempre più lavoro, tempo
1) (larger amount or number) piùmany were disappointed, more were angry — le persone deluse erano molte, ma ancora di più erano le persone arrabbiate
2) (additional amount, number) (di) più3.in Mexico, of which more later — in Messico, di cui riparleremo più avanti
2) (to a greater extent) di più, piùyou must work, rest more — devi lavorare, riposare di più
the more you think of it, the harder it will seem — più ci pensi, più ti sembrerà difficile
3) (longer)4) (again)5) (rather)6) more and more sempre (di) più7) more or less più o meno8) more so ancora di piùin York, and even more so in Oxford — a York, e ancor di più a Oxford
it is interesting, made (even) more so because — è interessante, ancor più perché
he is just as active as her, if not more so o or even more so è attivo quanto lei, se non di più; (all) the more so because ancora di più perché; they are all disappointed, none more so than him sono tutti delusi, ma nessuno quanto lui; no more so than usual — non più del normale
9) more than (greater amount or number) più di••••he's nothing more (nor less) than a thief he's a thief, neither more nor less è semplicemente un ladro, niente di più e niente di meno; he's nothing o no o not much more than a servant è soltanto un servo; and what is more e per di più, e come se non bastasse; there's more where that came from — non è che l'inizio
Note:When used as a quantifier to indicate a greater amount or quantity of something, more is very often translated by più, in più or ancora: more cars than people = più auto che persone; some more books = qualche libro in più / ancora qualche libro. For examples and further uses, see I.1 below.- When used to modify an adjective or an adverb to form the comparative, more is very often translated by più: more expensive = più caro; more beautiful = più bello; more easily = più facilmente; more regularly = più regolarmente. For examples and further uses, see III.1 below* * *[mo:]comparative; = much* * *(Surnames) More /mɔ:(r)/* * *[mɔː(r)] 1.quantisostantivo femminile1)2) more and more sempre più2.more and more work, time — sempre più lavoro, tempo
1) (larger amount or number) piùmany were disappointed, more were angry — le persone deluse erano molte, ma ancora di più erano le persone arrabbiate
2) (additional amount, number) (di) più3.in Mexico, of which more later — in Messico, di cui riparleremo più avanti
2) (to a greater extent) di più, piùyou must work, rest more — devi lavorare, riposare di più
the more you think of it, the harder it will seem — più ci pensi, più ti sembrerà difficile
3) (longer)4) (again)5) (rather)6) more and more sempre (di) più7) more or less più o meno8) more so ancora di piùin York, and even more so in Oxford — a York, e ancor di più a Oxford
it is interesting, made (even) more so because — è interessante, ancor più perché
he is just as active as her, if not more so o or even more so è attivo quanto lei, se non di più; (all) the more so because ancora di più perché; they are all disappointed, none more so than him sono tutti delusi, ma nessuno quanto lui; no more so than usual — non più del normale
9) more than (greater amount or number) più di••••he's nothing more (nor less) than a thief he's a thief, neither more nor less è semplicemente un ladro, niente di più e niente di meno; he's nothing o no o not much more than a servant è soltanto un servo; and what is more e per di più, e come se non bastasse; there's more where that came from — non è che l'inizio
Note:When used as a quantifier to indicate a greater amount or quantity of something, more is very often translated by più, in più or ancora: more cars than people = più auto che persone; some more books = qualche libro in più / ancora qualche libro. For examples and further uses, see I.1 below.- When used to modify an adjective or an adverb to form the comparative, more is very often translated by più: more expensive = più caro; more beautiful = più bello; more easily = più facilmente; more regularly = più regolarmente. For examples and further uses, see III.1 below -
4 more
mo:comparative; = muchmore adj adv pron mástr[mɔːSMALLr/SMALL]1 más■ do you want some more wine? ¿quieres más vino?■ no more tears! ¡basta de llorar!1 más1 más\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLmore and more cada vez másto be more than happy to do something hacer algo con mucho gustothe more..., the more... cuanto más..., más...the more..., the less... cuanto más..., menos...to see more of somebody ver a alguien más a menudomore ['mor] adv: máswhat more can I say?: ¿qué más puedo decir?more important: más importanteonce more: una vez másmore adj: másnothing more than that: nada más que esomore work: más trabajomore n: más mthe more you eat, the more you want: cuanto más comes, tanto más quieresmore pron: másmore were found: se encontraron másadj.• más adj.adv.• más adv.
I mɔːr, mɔː(r)a) (additional number, amount) máswould you like some more? — ¿quieres más?
how much more flour? — ¿cuánta harina más?
the more money you earn, the more tax you have to pay — cuanto más dinero se gana, (tantos) más impuestos hay que pagar
b) ( in comparisons) más
II
a) (additional number, amount) másand, what is more,... — y lo que es más,...
the more she eats, the thinner she gets — cuanto más come, más adelgaza
have you anything more to say? — ¿tiene algo más que decir?
b) ( in comparisons) máswe had four more than we needed — nos sobraron cuatro, había cuatro de más
my brother is more of a businessman than I am — mi hermano tiene mucha más idea para los negocios que yo
III
1)a) ( to greater extent) másb) (before adj, adv) máscould you please speak more clearly? — ¿podría hacer el favor de hablar más claro?
more often — con más frecuencia, más a menudo
2) (again, longer) másonce/twice more — una vez/dos veces más
3) ( rather)[mɔː(r)]1.ADJ más•
is there any more wine in the bottle? — ¿queda vino en la botella?•
a few more weeks — unas semanas más•
many more people — muchas más personas•
much more butter — mucha más mantequilla•
I have no more money — no me queda más dinerono more singing, I can't bear it! — ¡que no se cante más, no lo aguanto!
•
do you want some more tea? — ¿quieres más té?•
you have more money than I — tienes más dinero que yo•
it's two more miles to the house — faltan dos millas para llegar a la casa2. NPRON1) más•
we can't afford more — no podemos pagar más•
is there any more? — ¿hay más?•
a bit more? — ¿un poco más?•
a few more — algunos más•
a little more — un poco más•
many more — muchos más•
much more — mucho másthere isn't much more to do — no hay or queda mucho más que hacer
•
there's no more left — no queda (nada)let's say no more about it! — ¡no se hable más del asunto!
he no more thought of paying me than of flying to the moon — antes iría volando a la luna que pensar pagarme a mí
•
I shall have more to say about this — volveré a hablar de esto•
some more — más•
he's got more than me! — ¡él tiene más que yo!more than one/ten — más de uno/diez
not much more than £20 — poco más de 20 libras
•
and what's more... — y además...•
there's more where that came from! — ¡esto no es más que el principio!2)• (all) the more — tanto más
all the more so because or as or since... — tanto más cuanto que...
the more you give him the more he wants — cuanto más se le da, (tanto) más quiere
the more the better, the more the merrier — cuantos más mejor
3. ADV1) más•
more and more — cada vez más•
if he says that any more — si vuelve a decir eso, si dice eso otra vez•
"I don't understand it" - "no more do I" — -no lo comprendo -ni yo tampoco•
he's more intelligent than me — es más inteligente que yo2) (=again)once more — otra vez, una vez más
3) (=longer)•
he doesn't live here any more — ya no vive aquíMORE THAN•
Queen Anne is no more — la reina Ana ya no existe
"Más... que" or "más... de"?
► Use más with que before nouns and personal pronouns (provided they are not followed by clauses) as well as before adverbs and prepositions:
It was much more than a book Era mucho más que un libro
She knows more than I do about such things Ella sabe más que yo de esas cosas
Spain won more medals than ever before España logró más medallas que nunca ► Use más ... de lo que/del que/de la que/de los que/ de las que with following clauses:
It's much more complicated than you think Es mucho más complicado de lo que te imaginas
There's much more violence now than there was in the seventies Hay mucha más violencia ahora de la que había en los setenta ► Use más with de before lo + ((adjective/past participle)):
You'll have to work more quickly than usual Tendrás que trabajar más rápido de lo normal
It was more difficult than expected Fue más difícil de lo previsto ► Use más with de in comparisons involving numbers or quantity:
There were more than twenty people there Había más de veinte personas allí
More than half are women Más de la mitad son mujeres
They hadn't seen each other for more than a year No se veían desde hacía más de un año ► But más ... que c an be used with numbers in more figurative comparisons:
A picture is worth more than a thousand words Una imagen vale más que mil palabras
Más... que c an be used before numbers in the construction no... más que, meaning "only". Compare the following:
He only earns 1000 euros a month No gana más que 1000 euros al mes
He earns no more than 1000 euros a month No gana más de 1000 euros al mes
A lot more
► When translating a lot more, far more {etc} remember to make the mucho in mucho más a gree with any noun it describes or refers to:
We eat much more junk food than we used to Tomamos mucha más comida basura que antes
It's only one sign. There are a lot or many more Solo es una señal. Hay muchas más
A lot more research will be needed Harán falta muchos más estudios For further uses and examples, see more* * *
I [mɔːr, mɔː(r)]a) (additional number, amount) máswould you like some more? — ¿quieres más?
how much more flour? — ¿cuánta harina más?
the more money you earn, the more tax you have to pay — cuanto más dinero se gana, (tantos) más impuestos hay que pagar
b) ( in comparisons) más
II
a) (additional number, amount) másand, what is more,... — y lo que es más,...
the more she eats, the thinner she gets — cuanto más come, más adelgaza
have you anything more to say? — ¿tiene algo más que decir?
b) ( in comparisons) máswe had four more than we needed — nos sobraron cuatro, había cuatro de más
my brother is more of a businessman than I am — mi hermano tiene mucha más idea para los negocios que yo
III
1)a) ( to greater extent) másb) (before adj, adv) máscould you please speak more clearly? — ¿podría hacer el favor de hablar más claro?
more often — con más frecuencia, más a menudo
2) (again, longer) másonce/twice more — una vez/dos veces más
3) ( rather) -
5 Creativity
Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with DisorderEven to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)[P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity
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6 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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7 Knowledge
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)"Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
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